



RESEARCH PAPER

Partition Politics and Power Asymmetries: Reasons Behind Muslim-Majority Areas Were Not Fully Incorporated into Pakistan

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ABSTRACT

The paper dwells upon the causes of the failure of Muslim majority territories to be fully incorporated into Pakistan during the Partition of the British India in 1947 with considerable emphasis being laid on the politics of partition, power asymmetries and geographical location versus demographic logic as such. The research, which is founded on the Geopolitical Theory, Although the Ideological justification of the formation of Pakistan was founded based on Two Nation Theory. The paper is going to be premised on both primary and secondary data based on a qualitative research approach; some of the primary data sources include archival reports, reports of the boundary commissions, political memoirs, and scholarly interpretations. The qualitative approach is applicable in formulating an in-depth understanding of the specifics of historical contingencies, reality of decision-making, and the geopolitical reason that informed the territorialization of Pakistan that was not achieved.

KEYWORDS

Pakistan Partition 1947, Majority Muslim Areas, Territorial Integration, Power Asymmetries, Partition Politics, Princely States, Radcliffe Line, British Withdrawal, All-India Muslim League, Decolonization In India, Colonial Decolonization

Introduction

This is due to the fact that the Partition of British India in 1947 was one of the most dramatic political events in the twentieth century that resulted in the rise of Pakistan and India in the situation of mass migration, violence, and territorial and identity conflicts. The Two Nation Theory which believed in the fact that Muslims and Hindus were two nations whose political destinies could not be brought together in a single state became the focus of the creation of Pakistan. Following this logic, British India regions that were mainly inhabited by Muslims were to be incorporated in the new Muslim homeland. But the territorial reality was much otherwise to this ideal: different regions with majority population of Muslims such as areas of Punjab, Sylhet, Kashmir, Junagadh and Hyderabad were not included in Pakistan even at independence. This imbalance points to the fact that the Partition is geographically incidental to the demography of religion, but must be viewed in the framework of the macro-political, strategic and institutional factors that informed the demise of the British Raj.

Scholars have since surpassed the crude and demography based accounts to accentuate the power disparities and structural limits that were used to guide the partition

process. The Great Partition by Yasmin Khan places these events in a larger historical context and how the conflicting ideas of nationhood, administrative stalemate and colonial interests complicated the process of drawing the boundaries along the apparent communal boundaries. The political pressures at home coupled with the scramble out of the British kept the ideals of the perfect demarcation of the Muslim homeland in the hands of the pragmatist outlook and the political calculations. (Sani Panhwar)

A Jeremy Benthamled British boundaries delimitation commission, headed by the chairmanship of Sir Cyril Radcliffe was tasked with the purpose of drawing the boundaries that would partition Punjab and Bengal within the two new dominions in less than five weeks. With no knowledge of India and limited to the outdated census figures, Radcliffe had to balance between the religious majorities and the economic infrastructure, irrigation systems, transport connection and geopolitics. The resulting Radcliffe Line did not have to be founded on hard sense of demographics, and many Muslim majorities tehsils and districts were transferred to India. This can be seen in the Gurdaspur district and the Lahore district which had large populations of the Muslims who were Indian allocated hence giving India the Kashmir and saving major irrigation mechanisms- decisions that were not made based on the majority religion. (NIHCR)

Another example of the way in which the issue of boundary politics is confounded is the case of Sylhet in Assam. A referendum in Sylhet voted in favors of the accession to Pakistan but the final result of the arrangements made by Radcliffe was that certain parts such as Karimganj would be in India despite Muslims majority due to the consideration of the contiguity of borders and the effectiveness of the administration.

The princely states posed even greater problems on top of the provinces which were directly ruled by the British. These semi-autonomous polities with over 550 were left to their own devices under the Indian independence act. The major part of them was willing to accept the peace of India or Pakistan, whereas others became flashpoints. The first state to join Pakistan was Junagadh, a Muslim state but whose people were mostly Hindus, but India attacked it first in a military action and later annexed the state to the Indian Union which defined the limits of princely sovereignty and the value of power other than the mere demographic possession. A police action against Nizam and the large Muslim leadership also saw the integration of Hyderabad in India. Kashmir was one of the most unsolvable territorial issues as a majority population (Muslims) was governed by a Hindu maharaja who contributed to the first India-Pakistan war because he decided to join India.

Other historians such as Venkat Dhulipala feel that the understanding of the unfinished territorial fulfillment of Pakistan encompasses an examination whereby the ambitions of the Muslim League must be understood on the political imbalances of the late colonial rule. The operating strength of the League did not lie equally among the regions; in some of the regions it was not as strong as that of the Indian National Congress or local elites and this was an impediment to its ability to make definitive claim. Furthermore, due to the League assuming the shape of achieving a sovereign Pakistani state, its priorities were inclined more towards pragmatism at the negotiation table with the British and the Congress rather than increasing its territorialism. (Rare Book Society of India)

As will be argued in this paper, the partitioning of certain territories with a Muslim majority in Pakistan was not a demographic accident, but the result of a politics of partitioning, which was characterized by strategic interests, the dominance of power between the political factors, and the need to keep the colonial administration.

The reasons of the 1947 Partition are in the constitutional and political reforms that occurred during the British Raj. Representative rule, particularly, 1909, 1919 and 1935 Government of India Acts extended representative rule over time and also institutionalized communal electorates therefore giving religious divisions a political edge (Jalal, 1985; Talbot and Singh, 2009). The result of these structural changes was the increase in the competition between the All-India Muslim League and Indian national congress who had divergent views of the sovereignty, federalism and protection of minority (Khan, 2007).

The ideological idea of the necessity to create Muslim-majority autonomous states, which were codified with the Lahore Resolution in 1940, would be ideologically justified through the Two-Nation Theory (Dhulipala, 2015). However, post-Second World War economic drainage and desperation in the administration of Britain also played a critical role in determining how decolonization would be made. Indian independence act (July 1947) led to the rapid transfer of powers and this facilitated the consolidation of prolonged deliberations of the territories within a couple of weeks (Mansergh, 1977).

It was the Radcliffe Boundary Commission whose mandate was to demarcate the boundaries but who had to operate within a strict time constraint and on the conditions of escalating communal violence. According to experts, in such a case such strategic factors of control over transport routes, irrigation networks and defensible boundaries usually prevailed over the demographic majority which was strict (Jalal, 1985; Talbot and Singh, 2009). In case a consensus of partition existed it was not the results of population-founded division but a geopolitical scheme which had been negotiated because of power asymmetries and the necessity to leave the colonial rule.

The ideological suppositions of the Two-Nation Theory such as the notion that Muslim-majority-regions would make up Pakistan can be commonly termed as the cause of the Partition of 1947, which occurred within the confines of the religious demographic. However, some of the majorities of Muslims were not included in the formation of Pakistan and this raised severe questions of what affected the division of the land. Administrative expediency and communal violence in the British Raj has been identified in the literature (Khan, 2007; Talbot and Singh, 2009), whereas little focus has been paid to a geopolitical design, institutional asymmetry, and elite bargaining in determining the final outcomes. It was discovered that the Radcliffe Boundary Commission made decisions that were strategic in connectivity, irrigation patterns and political stability instead of demographic majorities (Jalal, 1985). The result of this is a historiographical vacuum: why and how have not even the ideological assertion covered some of the Muslim-majority territories? In order to address this issue, there is need to leave the demographic explanation to understand power differences, strategic geography, and priorities in colonial exit as forming incomplete territorial realization of Pakistan.

Literature Review

The question of why the complete inclusion of the Muslim majority areas did not take place in Pakistan in 1947 has caused several arguments in the historiography. Even though, the early academia has addressed the issue within the frameworks of communal identity and geographical distribution, a more recent literature is concerned with political institutions and power relations and also with tactical considerations, which shaped territorial decisions during Partition. This literature review offers the key conclusions of historians, political scientists and postcolonialists who demonstrate the fact that Partition is not to be reduced to the population scales but must be understood as negotiated geopolitical process in the conditions of institutional inequity and imperial withdrawal.

Remaking Partition with Non-communal Demography

The first reports on Partition were biased towards highlighting the religious identity as the key factor of sharing of lands. A group of scholars, such as R. M. Chopra, whose work can be traced back to the 1950s and 1960s, had it that this territorial discontinuity in Pakistan was a natural result of fundamentally irreconcilable Hindu-Muslim cleavages in the Muslim League. This demographic framing has been flawed however.

Yasmin Khan the *Great Partition* re-reads the event as a strategic and political negotiating process between other co-existing elites in a decadent colonial system. Khan suggests that despite the mobilizing nature of the language of religion, the fact is that borders were made on a case-by-case basis, and negotiations between the Muslim league, the congress and the British authorities (Khan, 2007). She cites instances of the subjection of demographic logic to administrative and strategic logic as in the assignment of mixed-population districts. It is the approach adopted by Khan that has given an academic space in which to comprehend Partition in the terms of political negotiation, with spatial characteristics and not an ordinary division of populations.

Similarly the thesis of the inevitability of Partition is disproven in the book by Ayesha Jalal because she declares that the founding of Pakistan was more about strategic decisions, colonial manipulation and elite negotiations that could not be founded on communal consequences (Jalal, 1985). Such emphasis on political agency and political dominance by Jalal goes straight to the belittling of the simplistic interpretations through the sheer numbers of religious majority.

Theory of partition Geopolitics

One of the valuable additions to the literature is the use of geopolitical theory in reference to Partition. In comparison to identity centric models, geopolitical approaches pay attention to the space, strategic location, infrastructure and defensive considerations as a centre of interest in the creation of territorial decisions.

Partition might also be reinterpreted in a geopolitical way in which *Creating a New Medina* by Venkat Dhulipala has possibly one of the most reinterpretations of Partition. Following the needs of Pakistan, Dhulipala frames the Muslim League as a bigger statebuilding undertaking that was most disturbed by the concept of strategic coherence and geopolitical viability (Dhulipala, 2015) was not sufficient in the case of Sylhet in Assam to grant accession because the territory had no direct affiliation with Pakistan that resulted in the change of the territorial outcomes (Misra, 1998). On that same note, the accession of the Gurdaspur district to India despite the fact that there are a good number of Muslims has been explained by strategic reasons of being capable of reaching Kashmir and also giving them a location that is well guarded (Talbot and Singh, 2009).

The geopolitical theory has as such been critical to abandon the reductive understandings and coming up with a skew toward the appreciation of how territorial politics have infiltrated into the strategic interests and the geographical logic.

Power Inequality among Political participants

Unequal capacities of the prevailing political actors of the Partition are also pointed out in the literature. The greatest imbalance existed between the All India Muslim league

and the Indian national congress but the role of the British colonial power and the princely states were also essential.

Although the Muslim league was effective in fulfilling the Pakistan demand, it was not equally organized all over the British India. Punjab and Bengal, being the strongholds of the Muslim majority, were very strong in the League, whereas in mixed population areas like the Sindh, NWFP, Assam it was weak (Ganguly, 1994). This is the weakness of the organization, which limited the capability of the League in exerting control over the pockets of the majority of Muslims in the provinces that were not its support centers.

The Congress in its turn saved the robust organizational presence and also experience in administration across India. The negotiations and decisions about the boundaries were affected by the Congress domination of the local government system and population even in the provinces with majority of Muslims, as the controversial politics of Assam and Sylhet showed.

The British colonial administration in its turn took advantage of its administrative authority and procedural dominance and produced its impact in the outcomes using such an instrument as the Radcliffe Boundary Commission. Barbara D. Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf noted that the Radcliffe process (which was extremely time-bound) was forced to compromise on demographic factors and concentrate on administrative expediency and economic viability (Metcalf and Metcalf, 2006). The British withdrawal policy was necessary to withdraw and not because they wanted to continue the same status of commitment in demographic partitioning.

The image was also complicated by a presence of princely states that were quasi-sovereign states that were ruled by the colonial rule indirectly. The rulers were no more decisive than popular sentiment in accession, as occurred in Hyderabad, Junagadh, and Kashmir. The Muslim chiefs of Hyderabad and Junagadh were originally attempting to remain independent or be part of Pakistan but not being contiguous and the pressure of the Indian army involved them to become part of India (Menon, 1956). Kashmir under the rule of a Hindu maharaja of a Muslim majority is an example of the interaction of the decision-making of the elite, strategic calculations, and the application of military force with local identity politics to give controversial territorial outcomes.

Connotations and Systemic Constraints Postcolonial

The postcolonial theorists criticize the national histories and the theories of geopolitics based on the fact that they do not explain the histories of colonialism and the structural imperatives well. According to the article written by Partha Chatterjee on nationalism, the communal mobilization and political identities had been developed due to the influence of the colonial administrative systems that remained in place even after independence (Chatterjee, 1993).

Though this is not a theory under consideration specifically towards Partition, the orientalism theory as practiced by Edward Said also gives suggestions to the mental maps of place and community by the elite that they apply in shaping the imagination of nationhood (Said, 1978). Both Said and Chatterjee encourage the reader to see partition as a structural problem in colonialism legacies, and not as a savage war of ethnic or religious turmoil.

These readings are not substitutes of the geopolitical theory since they are used to point out that borders were not merely a matter of number of majorities and strategy, but also a matter of colonial administration categories, legal customs, literacy spaces, and spatial imaginaries that established how the territories were imagined as to political matters.

The scholars have applied different qualitative methods to unravel the secrets of Partition. Oral histories, archival documents, the records of the boundary commission and political memoirs have been of significance. Some literature like that of Ishtiaq Ahmed, e.g. is founded on parliamentary files and League documents to show how the strategic considerations often triumphed over the demographic issues (Ahmed, 2000).

The chain of decisions that have led to the achievement of specific territorial outcomes have been both explained using process tracing in the qualitative political science. The maps were found to develop according to the information restrictions, colonial interests and lobbying of the local elites within the process of negotiation involving Radcliffe and his negotiating partners that were revealed in research studies, which examine the development of the lines in the course of the weeks of the negotiation (Butalia, 1998).

Despite the large literature on the Partition of 1947, there is a keen appreciation of the geopolitical and institutional forces that influenced the failure in total territorial accomplishment of Pakistan. A sizeable portion of the literature has never been liberal on the identity of the communities or the population imbalances and the alienation of the Muslim majority has been fashioned as a by-product of the Hindu-Muslim disputes or the ill-advised leadership (Chopra, 1968; Jalal, 1985). In spite of the fact that they provide us with some insight into the ideological motives, these approaches are inclined to weaken the structural and strategic interests which in fact influenced the territorial outcomes decisively.

The component of geopolitics that has been introduced in the previous literature sources was the significance of gaining geographical location, defensible borders, and inter-connectivity (Dhulipala, 2015; Talbot and Singh, 2009). Little has been done with the power asymmetry theory to incorporate it with the geopolitics analysis to figure out why power held by some regions dominated by Muslims such as Kashmir, Junagadh and Sylhet did not feature in the ideological claims. Moreover, British administrative urgency, princely state politics with its mediating aspects and colonial legacies have not been explored systematically and qualitatively.

With the aim of bridging this gap, the paper will concentrate on the territorial formation as a negotiated and strategic process through the prism of geopolitical, institutional, and postcolonial approaches. Such structural imbalances can also be studied in subsequent studies in regard to the stability of various regions in the long-run, and the cross-border wars, which will result in a broader understanding of Partition, and in addition to demographic determinism.

Theoretical Framework

This paper relies on the concept of geopolitics and asymmetry of power to present arguments as to why not all of the Muslim majority regions became part of Pakistan in 1947. The framework views the process of the territorial formation as a negotiation that is informed by the strategic geography, institutional inequality, and colonial administrative

limitations, instead of viewing Partition as a mere demographic partitioning (Jalal, 1985; Khan, 2007).

The geopolitical theory is at the center of the scheme and is concerned with the strategic importance of the land, including connectivity, defensible borders, accessibility to rivers, transport channels, and economic infrastructure as they form states (Dhulipala, 2015; Talbot and Singh, 2009). According to this perspective, religious demography did not play an exclusive role in the actions of the All-India Muslim League, the Indian National Congress and the British government, but estimates of territorial feasibility and the long-term strategic integrity. The drawing of the Radcliffe Line has represented this movement: the priorities of irrigation headworks and railway connections together with the practicability of the administrative institutions were usually stretched far beyond the strict rules and regulations of the majority population patterns (Metcalf and Metcalf, 2006). Thus, the concept of spatial rationality was introduced as the boundary-making which was inherent in the geopolitical factors.

The framework incorporates Power Asymmetry Theory based on which the institutional control, the bureaucratic reach and the capacity of coercion provide the disproportionate power over the participants of transitional political situations (Ganguly, 1994). During the late colonial period in India, Congress and the League, the colonial rulers and the local political leaders, the princely rulers and the ruled, had asymmetries. This structural disequilibrium restricted the possibility of the League to overtake control of the peripheral Muslim-majority areas such as Kashmir, Junagadh, and parts of Assam even though there were ideology precepts that were grounded on the Two-Nation Theory (Ahmed, 2000).

Finally, the framework puts Partition into perspective in the decolonization theory by viewing Partition as an early imperial withdrawal in a hasty fashion through the Indian Independence Act 1947. The rush to evacuate the British forces put the worth of speed, consistency and ongoing rule over that of demographic precision (Khan, 2007). Taken together these interrelated theoretical prisms provide a systematic explanation of the unmet territorial accomplishment of Pakistan as a working of strategic geography in terms of imbalanced power relations in the retreat of imperialism.

Material and Methods

The specified research employs a qualitative research design to get to know why not all Pakistan-majority regions became a constituent of this country in the Partition of 1947. The qualitative design is the most appropriate to use in the research of elite negotiations, as the institutional asymmetries and geopolitical calculations in the context of which it is impossible to fully explain only the studies of quantitative demographic data (Creswell, 2014). Scholarship in international partition has also been concerned more with interpretive and archival studies as a means of unveiling the contingent and negotiated character of the territorial outcomes (Khan, 2007; Jalal, 1985).

The research employs primarily the document analysis as a key method on both primary and secondary audits. The official records of the Boundary Commissions, the discussion of the Indian Independence Act 1947 in the Parliament, correspondence of the political powers, memoirs, and administrative archives on the drawing of the Radcliffe Line are the major sources. These articles provide some insight on strategic thinking, bureaucratic constraints and political bargaining procedures that played a role in territorial decision-making (Metcalf and Metcalf, 2006). The academic monographs and peer-

reviewed partitions as the interpretation of the divisive strategies based on geopolitical, institutional, and postcolonial levels are the secondary sources (Dhulipala, 2015; Talbot and Singh, 2009).

The themes employed in the paper are aimed at arriving at the recurring patterns by the geographical approach in terms of strategies, power imbalance, continuity of administration and elite decision making (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Specific attention is paid to the case studies of controversial Muslim majority states, including Kashmir, Junagadh, Hyderabad and Sylhet in order to examine the connection between local politics and bigger colonial and national structures of power (Ahmed, 2000).

Process tracing is applied to the study in order to reproduce the chronology of negotiations and decision making among the All-India Muslim League, the Indian National Congress, the British government and the rulers of the princely states to attain a better standard of analytical rigor. Process tracing enables developing cause and effect connections between geopolitical issues and institutional disparities and definite territorial results (George and Bennett, 2005).

Overall, this qualitative method may be employed to explain Partition as a negotiation and strategically informed process based on the unequal distribution of power and not purely on demographic determinism.

Results and Discussion

The geographical outcome of the Partition of 1947 demonstrates that the inclusion or exclusion of the Muslim majority regions into Pakistan was less dependent on the demographic arithmetic and more based on the geographical strategic aspects, institutional disparities and the decolonization politics (Jalal, 1985; Khan, 2007). Although the Two-Nation Theory provides an ideological rationalization of the establishment of Pakistan, it was put into space through the negotiations of unequal actors on the conditions of harsh time and administration.

The Geography of Strategic and the Frontiers of Demographic Logic

The Radcliffe Line is drawn in such a way that it satisfies majority of the geopolitics that dominates religion. Sir Cyril Radcliffe was counseled to consider the other factors excluding population like the economic infrastructures, irrigation facilities, railway connection and administrative continuity (Metcalf and Metcalf, 2006). The Indian dominion of the Kashmir region and the preservation of the logistical integrity was brought about by the split of a very populous Muslim country of Gurdaspur into India (Talbot and Singh, 2009). This decision points to the importance of the provisions of territorial viability and strategic entry points over naked demographic justification.

Similarly in Bengal and in Assam, the outcome was decided on administrative coherence and proximity. As far as the Sylhet referendum favored the accession of Pakistan, there were also some adjustments of the boundaries so that India could retain some regions to ensure that the boundaries and communications could be manageable (Misra, 1998). Such cases suggest that Partition was some sort of geographical restructuring which was informed by defensibility and connectivity and not by communal arithmetic (Dhulipala, 2015).

Political imbalances amongst political actors

The disparity in the organizational strength of the All-India Muslim League and an Indian national Congress largely influenced the territorial results. In 1946, the League was a successful party in terms of electoral politics because it institutionalized higher in mixed or peripheral regions (Ganguly, 1994). Congress, on its part, possessed immense administrative contacts and was more knowledgeable of the governance systems in British India.

These asymmetries were transformed into bargaining power where such negotiation was required to be made with the British authorities. An even greater part of the Congress in Assam, like that which it had been in a position to assume, made it to place the future of Sylhet in the larger provincial problems of stability. Meanwhile, the primary agenda of the League was to have independent Pakistan and in this respect, they could not afford to insist on all the enclaves that were mainly majority Muslim (Jalal, 1985).

The British colonial government also played some decisive role that maintained procedural control of power transfer. The Indian independence act of 1947 was urging withdrawal which lacked time to conduct extensive boundary survey. Expediency was also favorable to administrative viable lines to be demographically correct therefore entrenching institutional distinctions that were already present (Khan, 2007).

Elite Decision-Making and Princely States

The independent legal status was the 565 princely states which were technically indirectly administered under the colonial rule. Demographic determinism was also disempowered as they had joined not by plebiscite consultations but by the rulers (Menon, 1956).

The Muslim ruler of the primarily Hindu state of Junagadh agreed to join Pakistan and since it was not contiguous and subsequently the moves of India, they were absorbed into India. Independence of Nizam of Hyderabad was also being sought but this was not a workable suggestion because of the geopolitical isolation of the Indian land. The indicative conviction of the 1948 police action of India was indicative of the primacy of the territorial consolidation consideration in comparison to the lawful claims.

The longest-running case of the interaction between geopolitical calculation and the elite power is Kashmir. Most Muslims were ruled by a Hindu maharaja who did not participate in the unrest and invasion hence resulting in the first Indo-Pakistani war (Talbot and Singh, 2009). Both states were focused on the calculations of the geographical tactical factors (mountains, rivers, and borders). In the episode, it is depicted that the elite decision-making and military power turned out to be the determinants of the territorial orientation and not the demography.

Stopping Colonial Administrative Traditions and Systemic Forces

Division was performed in hereditary colonial administrative systems that were inclined to centralization of power and bureaucratic stability (Chatterjee, 1993). Imperial government had established census categories, lines and systems of revenue, instead of nation-state building. Consequently, naturally defined national boundaries were replaced by spatial delimitations which were founded on colonial rationality.

In addition, the British exit agendas were focused on the speediness and predictability rather than on the focus on demographic justice. The growing degree of

violence in Punjab and Bengal heightened the choice of a high-speed goal of boundaries, which did not permit time to consult once more. The subsequent settlement represented the administratively possible within a few weeks, as opposed to the normatively optimal (Khan, 2007).

Formation of a Negotiated type State and Incomplete Territorial Realization.

Such segregation by some Muslim majority regions should hence be regarded as the outcome of negotiated state formation between asymmetrical power relations. This is because Islam was to gain in Pakistan not maximum territory but a unified state with its heart in western Punjab, Sindh, NWFP and eastern Bengal. There was an increased vulnerability to ostracism in the peripheral regions with no contiguity, administrative, or strategic issues (Dhulipala, 2015).

This tendency demonstrates that Partition was not a geopolitical compromise but the demographic referendum that was predisposed by the bargaining power, the infrastructural networks, the interests of the elites, and the military pressure. Majorities of the populace were not always to be politically incorporated because the territorial decision was lodged into more substantial systems of power and plan.

The fact is that, the failure of Pakistan to develop its territories completely cannot be attributed only to the communal fragmentation or lack of leadership. Rather, it was a result of institutional geography in disproportional locations in an abrupt withdrawal of the imperial power. It reinterprets Partition to be a negotiated and disputed geopolitical process and no longer a religious partitioning based on forecasts of power disparities, colonial bureaucracies and geography (Jalal, 1985; Khan, 2007).

Discussion

This paper acknowledges that the partition of Pakistan in 1947 to exclude some of the parts of the Muslim majority was largely a geopolitical plan and institutional imbalance and not an adherence to the ideas of demographic majority. The political outcomes of the Partition territorial consequences of decolonization process were the manifestation of the political reality of unequal distribution of power among the actors in competition.

Firstly, the outcomes demonstrate that strategic geography usually became dominant over the religious demography when it came to deciding on the boundaries. Population ratios were not the sole factors which helped in the drawing of the Radcliffe Line, other issues such as irrigation systems, railway networks, access corridors and defensible borders were also put into consideration. The canal headworks problems, trade routes and administrative viability were the issues that affected the decisions in Punjab and Bengal. As a result, India was left with a few Muslim-majority tehsils and districts to sustain infrastructural continuity and geopolitical relationship, in particular, the Kashmir and eastern communication networks.

Second, it was observed that one of the factors that had an impact on the territorial outcomes in the study was the power asymmetries among political actors. Although the All-India Muslim League was very effective with regard to shaping the demand of attaining Pakistan, it did not have equal institutional coverage and administrative supremacy as the Indian National Congress. The existence of the congress and their high bargaining power in the organizational setup of certain provinces coupled with the British

procedure control led to an influence in how the boundary decisions were framed and implemented. The strategic consideration of the League in order to guarantee a viable sovereign state also translated to viable compromises in the peripheral regions.

Third, the research unveils the determining factor of the princely politics and elite powers of states. The accession was determined by rulers in certain states such as, Kashmir, Junagadh and Hyderabad and not by direct plebiscatory and Indian Independence Act of 1947. The aspect of elite preference, taking into account contiguity and in some cases through military intervention hence shaped territorial incorporation.

Finally, the findings reveal that Partition was applied in the administrative expediency and colonial retreat sphere and was founded on expediency and stability, but not the demographic precision. This hurried shift in power reduced the time taken to consult extensively and enhanced the decisions that were founded on pragmatism.

The overall conclusion of the work is that there were geopolitical calculations, the institutional inequality and need of colonial exit that cannot be reduced by the reductionist approaches explain solely the structural pre-conditions of incomplete territorial realization in Pakistan.

Conclusion

The 1947 Partition was not the mere demonstration of demographics on the principle of religious majority, but a completely political and geopolitical operation founded on the strategic considerations, institutional disparity, and the requirements of imperial withdrawals. This study has demonstrated that marginalization of some of the Muslim dominated regions in Pakistan did not purely lie in the communal disintegration but even the inability of the leadership. Instead, the outcome of the territorial affairs was the aftereffect of the negotiated settlement whereby the geography, military, and administrative factors acquired dominant positions.

However, being the ideological framework of the formation of Pakistan, the Two-Nation Theory had the mediating influence of the structural realities in its territorial realisation. The Radcliffe Line boundary indicates that not just any population ratio came into play when it came to making boundaries with canal headworks, railway lines, economic infrastructure, and places that could be defended. In Punjab and Bengal long-term rationality tended frequently to override the adherence of religious majorities. The access routes, communication lines and irrigation systems were taken to be the significant component of the state stability, and the geopolitical nature of the settlement was underlined.

The territorial structure was also affected by political asymmetries in the power of political actors. Although the All-India Muslim League gained an electoral legitimacy in 1946 it lacked the administrative scope and institutional density that the Indian National Congress was distributed across all the regions in dispute. The larger network and experience that the organization had with provincial systems of government granted congress higher bargaining power on negotiations. In the meantime, the British officials remained procedurally dominant in the transference of power by the Indian Independence Act of 1947. The imperial exodus aspect made the practice of imperial exit to be more emphatic on expediency and administrative utility than on demographic accuracy as it empowered actors that had greater institutional power.

They were not similar to British India in legal terms and the people governing the princely states were not necessarily elected by the people on what to do. The option of the elite, isolation of territories, and above all the military intervention had been the methods of the formation of the territorial alignment in the case of Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir. The Kashmir case, particularly, cites the fact that geographical strategy and means to coerce were more significant than a sense of demography and created a legacy of warfare that continues to characterize South Asian politics.

The colonial administrative legacies also restricted the process. The delimitation of districts, census and revenue divisions was established under imperial rule, in contrast to a nation-state construction. These inherited forms proved to be the grid where the rushed decisions were made as the decolonization process had to be hastened in the environment of increasing the violence rates. What emerged was a cartographical solution that was consistent with that which was administratively feasible in small periods of time and not what was normatively sensible to the logic of demographics.

All in all, the failure of the Pakistan state to achieve its territorial integrity should be viewed as a consequence of the bargained state-building in the circumstances of the unequal powers of power during the period of the decolonization acceleration. The partitioning process was an artificial political settlement that was established based on the strategic cores and network of infrastructures and an institutional power that was not by sheer demographic partition. This recognition of this multifacetedness contributes to the history of the historiography of Partition because it allows situating the territorial effects within the general context of power, space, and embrace colonization. This explanation goes beyond the reductionist explanations, and highlights that the borders of 1947 were erected based on political capability and political reasoning in addition to an ideological aspiration.

Recommendations

According to the findings of the current research several directions of future research may be outlined. First, in this instance, the researchers are to carry out comparative geopolitical examinations of other decolonization cases in order to realize whether this tendency of strategic line forming and power lack were instrumental in shaping the outcomes of territorial politics. The Partition of British India may also illuminate the process of decolonization in its rush towards the frontiers of the borders of borders beyond demographic logic compared to other imperial withdrawals.

Second, more research should be undertaken to incorporate the use of both archival and research into the different national collections and archives in Britain, India and Pakistan in order to uncover further correspondence, intelligence reports and boundary talks along the Radcliffe Line and the passage of the Indian Independence act of 1947. Further access to declassified information can enhance our sensibility to elite politics and preferences of strategizing.

Third, interdisciplinary strategies that embrace political geography, international relations theory and technologies of spatial mapping may be the way to provide a more systematic analysis of infrastructural and territorial issues in 1947.

Lastly, the unresolved territorial conflicts especially in Kashmir should be looked into in future research in a way that it can be seen as the reflection of structural asymmetry and geopolitical calculating Partition. This type of research would enhance the

comprehension about the role of the legacy of 1947 in modern South Asian security politics and regional politics.

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